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Thoughts on SOF Week 2024

Posted on May 16, 2024September 1, 2025 by Austin

I recent­ly attend­ed Spe­cial Oper­a­tion Force (SOF) Week 2024, which was not just a chance to recon­nect with old friends but also a valu­able plat­form to delve into the evolv­ing needs of our HQ. The SOF Com­mu­ni­ty’s relent­less pur­suit of emerg­ing tech­nol­o­gy under­scores its recog­ni­tion of the com­pet­i­tive edge it offers to our warfight­ers. The SOF com­mu­ni­ty is often equipped with supe­ri­or intel­li­gence, advanced weapon­ry, and sound gov­ern­ment and civil­ian senior lead­er­ship, allow­ing our warfight­ers to exe­cute their missions.

Attend­ing SOF Week also allows the force to under­stand how the senior lead­er­ship thinks about the cur­rent state of affairs. The count­less senior lead­er­ship briefs focused on part­ner­ing with our NATO part­ners and strength­en­ing our rela­tion­ships to counter the world’s trou­bles were deliv­ered clear­ly. The world trou­bles include:

  • The ongo­ing con­flict in Ukraine.
  • Hamas’ Octo­ber 7 cross-bor­der cow­ard­ly attack on Israel.
  • U.S. involve­ment in Niger
  • Chi­na’s unre­strict­ed war­fare against the U.S.

Most U.S. involve­ment pro­vides advi­so­ry ser­vices or weapons to strength­en the con­flict­ing coun­try’s self-defense and diplo­mat­ic ser­vices to bro­ker solu­tions between nation-states. With all this effort, I am stuck with a sim­ple ques­tion: Is the U.S. focus­ing too much on oth­er nations’ secu­ri­ty than focus­ing on its security? 

For the sake of sim­plic­i­ty, let’s focus on Chi­na’s ongo­ing threat against the U.S.

First, we have a bor­der issue.  Accord­ing to Office of Home­land Secu­ri­ty Sta­tis­tics data, encoun­ters on the south­ern bor­der of those try­ing to enter the U.S. with­out autho­riza­tion have increased sig­nif­i­cant­ly. The DHS data show 6.5 mil­lion encoun­ters at the U.S.-Mexico bor­der in that time frame, a fig­ure that includes both the 5.8 mil­lion appre­hen­sions between legal ports of entry – the num­ber typ­i­cal­ly used for ille­gal immi­gra­tion – and a lit­tle more than 700,000 migrants who arrived at ports of entry with­out autho­riza­tion to enter the U.S. What ampli­fies the board­er issue fur­ther, is that the U.S. can­not account for who has entered the coun­try. For exam­ple, for Year to Date (YTD), there have been 24,376 Chi­nese nation­als encoun­tered at the South­west bor­der, and 24,214 of them were appre­hend­ed ille­gal­ly cross­ing the bor­der, per the U.S. House Com­mit­tee on Home­land Secu­ri­ty.  What about the oth­er 162 Chi­nese nation­als not account­ed for?

Sec­ond­ly, we have for­eign advi­sories con­test­ing U.S. air­space. The five known Chi­nese bal­loon flights into U.S. ter­ri­to­ry are a prime exam­ple of U.S. air space being con­test­ed. Of the five inci­dents, three were under Trump’s admin­is­tra­tion, and two were dur­ing the Biden admin­is­tra­tion. The well-known Feb­ru­ary 2023 inci­dent involved a 200-foot-tall bal­loon car­ry­ing a pay­load weigh­ing over 2,000 pounds. It entered U.S. air­space over Alas­ka on Jan­u­ary 28, then again over the con­ti­nen­tal U.S. on Jan­u­ary 31. The bal­loon was even­tu­al­ly shot down off the coast of South Car­oli­na by an F‑22 fight­er jet. The bal­loon’s path includ­ed sight­ings in Kansas, Mis­souri, North Car­oli­na, and South Car­oli­na. It like­ly also tra­versed states such as Wyoming, South Dako­ta, Nebras­ka, and Ken­tucky, which host sev­er­al U.S. mil­i­tary installations.

Last­ly, Chi­na’s cyber threats pose a sig­nif­i­cant and ongo­ing chal­lenge to the Unit­ed States’ eco­nom­ic and nation­al secu­ri­ty. These threats pri­mar­i­ly man­i­fest in cyber espi­onage, intel­lec­tu­al prop­er­ty theft, and attacks on crit­i­cal infra­struc­ture. Chi­nese hack­ers, often state-spon­sored, tar­get U.S. com­pa­nies and gov­ern­ment agen­cies to steal intel­lec­tu­al prop­er­ty and trade secrets, under­min­ing the com­pet­i­tive­ness of U.S. busi­ness­es and result­ing in sig­nif­i­cant eco­nom­ic loss­es. This eco­nom­ic espi­onage also extends to steal­ing sen­si­tive eco­nom­ic and tech­no­log­i­cal infor­ma­tion, which can dis­rupt indus­tries and hin­der eco­nom­ic growth.

On the nation­al secu­ri­ty front, Chi­na’s cyber capa­bil­i­ties threat­en U.S. mil­i­tary and defense sys­tems. Cyber attacks can com­pro­mise nation­al secu­ri­ty, dis­rupt mil­i­tary oper­a­tions, and com­pro­mise clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion. Addi­tion­al­ly, attacks on crit­i­cal infra­struc­ture sec­tors can dis­rupt essen­tial ser­vices and com­pro­mise pub­lic safety.

Fur­ther­more, Chi­nese cyber oper­a­tions may aim to influ­ence polit­i­cal process­es and deci­sion-mak­ing with­in the Unit­ed States, poten­tial­ly under­min­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, and nation­al sovereignty.

I am not the only one who has voiced this con­cern. The U.S. North­ern Com­mand (USNORTCOM) and North Amer­i­ca Aero­space Defense Com­mand (NORAD) com­bat­ant com­mand gen­er­al, Gen­er­al Glen Vah­her­ck, stat­ed in his March 22, 2022, state­ment before the Sen­ate Armed Ser­vices Committee,

“For decades, the Unit­ed States has been accus­tomed to choos­ing when and where the nation will employ the mil­i­tary lever of influ­ence and project pow­er around the globe from a home­land that was assumed to be secure. Our com­peti­tors have stud­ied this oper­at­ing mod­el for the last 30 years and have devel­oped strate­gies and capa­bil­i­ties intend­ed to off­set our mil­i­tary advan­tage and dis­rupt our force flows.  Quite blunt­ly, my abil­i­ty to con­duct the mis­sions assigned to USNORTHCOM and NORAD has erod­ed and con­tin­ues to erode. Our coun­try is under attack dai­ly in the infor­ma­tion space and cyber domain.” 

In con­clu­sion, SOF Week 2024 has pro­vid­ed valu­able insights into the evolv­ing needs of the SOF com­mu­ni­ty and its ongo­ing glob­al chal­lenges. How­ev­er, it also raised impor­tant ques­tions about the U.S.‘s focus on inter­na­tion­al secu­ri­ty at the poten­tial expense of its own.

The ongo­ing bor­der issue, for­eign advi­sories con­test­ing U.S. air­space, and Chi­na’s cyber threats are sig­nif­i­cant con­cerns that must be addressed. The U.S. must bal­ance its role in glob­al secu­ri­ty with pro­tect­ing its bor­ders, air­space, and cyber­space. Gen­er­al Glen Vah­her­ck point­ed out that our com­peti­tors have devel­oped strate­gies to off­set our mil­i­tary advan­tage and dis­rupt our force flows. There­fore, the U.S. must reassess its secu­ri­ty strat­e­gy, pri­or­i­tize its secu­ri­ty needs, and devel­op robust mea­sures to counter these threats. By doing so, the U.S. main­tains its com­pet­i­tive edge and con­tin­ues to safe­guard its eco­nom­ic and nation­al security.

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